The End of NATO and the Decline of American Influence in Europe

By Joon Suh

Once a solution to many of the post-Cold War security conundrums among the constituents of the western hemisphere, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is now facing problems from within. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates poignantly enunciated the American grievance in his latest policy speech. Apparently, impatience and discontent is brewing in the US Congress with “expending precious funds [three quarters of total NATO expenditure¹] on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.”²

Gates’ remark offers much food for thought that belongs to the realist school of international politics. Uncle Sam is frustrated with free-riders. In the language of international politics, the act of free-riding would be referred to as “buck-passing” – a spontaneous transfer of strategic liability to another player in the survival game. In fact, realism – particularly the kind professed by John Mearsheimer – predicts that the seductiveness of buck-passing grows within an alliance structure (This practice can also be seen in scenes of ordinary social life when, for example, a group of friends find it easier to get one friend to assume the responsibilities of arranging trips, events, etc. than it is to get a stranger to bear the burden).

Is NATO on decline? Yes. But, more importantly, so is American influence in Europe. NATO has been the centerpiece through which American power was projected to balance against rival powers in Europe. Not only has it been a guise of multilateralism, it has also been a pretext for a significant US military presence in Europe. With NATO falling apart, the United States will see its European privileges gradually diminish, along with its leverage.

What is happening to NATO? The most obvious propellant behind the division would be that NATO members, both US and European, are simply less willing, thus less cohesive. While the US has relied on its “coalition of the willing” since the onset of its war on terror in 2001, many European countries – especially Germany – have simply lost the appetite to join the American cause, enervated from the difficult and protracted war in Afghanistan. Not only that, the western response to the recent Libyan crisis also attests to the American reluctance to further expand its commitment to policing actions. Add that to NATO’s post-Cold War identity crisis. The sum of that equation is a slowly tarnishing band of western powers.

Moreover, there is a continental power on the rise. Not only is it a global economic dark horse but it is also the heir to old Soviet’s formidable military prowess. While the United States is an imported counterweight, impeded by the stopping power of water, Russia is a continental power with an unfettered geographic access to Europe. Geographic access is tantamount to a strategic edge that will allow Russia to continue expanding its orbit westward. In fact, Russia has relentlessly wielded its economic and military power. In early 2009, Gazprom ceased its natural gas supply to Ukraine over a payment dispute which provoked responses from Germany and other European heavyweight figures. In 2008, Russia instigated a ground operation against Georgia, a country agreed to be accepted as a member of the NATO. In 2007, Russia suspended the Conventional Weapons in Europe (CFE) Treaty – a post-Cold War pact designed to limit the amount of conventional weapons within a certain area – as a corollary of US plans to deploy missile elements in eastern Europe. Many more Russian maneuvers for power during the past few years suggest that Russia is a major powerhouse at large with prolific ambition to underpin its position on the European stage.

American supremacy in international politics remains a galvanizing force around the world. The United States has been able to build its unrivaled military prowess and second-to-none economic wherewithal because it was an isolated power. However, isolation comes with its own set of woes. Although the United States may have the capability to make its forces virtually omnipresent, it must be noted again that its role in the main theaters of contested power – Northeast Asia and Europe – will be limited to the name of an “offshore balancer.”³ This is definitely something that will occupy at least a noteworthy place in the trajectory of Russia’s continental quest.

There is no pending radical shift in the European balance-of-power. However, it is noteworthy that such tectonic movement could take place more easily in Europe than it could in Northeast Asia. Unlike Northeast Asia, there is no explicit military standoff in Europe. Plus, the US military presence in Europe is not as large as it is in Northeast Asia, and it is said that only 2% of EU countries’ forces are combat-ready (which is something Gates has expressed profound concerns on).⁴ Plus, European economies are dependent to varying degrees on Russian energy sources. Gates’ premonition of a “dim future” for NATO makes it even easier and more compelling for Russia to better relate itself to Europe. All-in-all, without a serious change in the present undercurrent, the future prospect of the European balance of power will favor Russia.

1 Shanker, Thom & Erlanger, Steve (2011) “Blunt U.S. Warning Reveals Deep Strains in NATO” June 10th, 2011 International Herald Tribune

2 Ibid.

3 Mearsheimer, John J. (2003) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics p. 234

4 Merritt, Giles, Niblett, Robin & Serra, Narcis (2011) “Debating Defense” Project Syndicate